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Abstract  
This paper is a guide for citizens, scientists, resource managers, and policy makers, who 
are interested in understanding the economic and social value of marine protected areas (MPAs).    
We discuss the potential benefits and costs associated with MPAs as a means of illustrating the 
economic and social tradeoffs inherent in implementation decisions.  In general, the effectiveness 
of a protected area depends on a complex set of interactions between biological, economic, and 
institutional factors.  While MPAs might provide protection for critical habitats and cultural 
heritage sites and, in some cases, conserve biodiversity, as a tool to enhance fishery management 
their impact is less certain.  The uncertainty stems from the fact that MPAs only treat the 
symptoms and not the fundamental causes of overfishing and waste in fisheries.  
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Marine Protected Areas: Economic and Social Implications 
James N. Sanchirico, Kathryn A. Cochran, and Peter M. Emerson∗ 
Introduction 
Among the nations of the world, the United States is unique for its huge and diverse 
endowment of living marine resources.  As shown in Figure 1, the U.S. has about 95,000 miles 
of coastline and more than 3.4 million square miles of ocean in its domain (NOAA, 1998).  
Within these waters, a marine biodiversity rivaling that of some of our most treasured land-based 
systems exists.  From coral reefs and sea grass beds to salt marshes and mangrove forests, the 
ocean and coastal areas surrounding the United States and its territories are teeming with marine 
life.    
These habitats and the resources they support provide the public with a valuable and 
diverse set of goods and services, including seafood, recreational enjoyment, carbon 
sequestration, storm protection, and opportunities for pharmaceutical discoveries.  For example, 
commercial fisheries alone add approximately $27 billion per year to U.S. gross domestic 
product (NOAA 2000).  In addition, about 3.5 million acres of coastal wetlands, salt marshes, 
shrub wetlands, flats, and shoals provide many vital services and resources, such as nursery, 
feeding, breeding, and resting areas for fish, shrimp, crabs, mollusks, and birds.  The coastal 
environment also supports many tourism and recreation activities that contribute, in total, about 
$595 billion annually to gross domestic product, making it the second largest contributor (NOAA 
1999). 
While the ocean is critical to society’s economic and social well-being, scientific studies 
confirm that many of our marine resources are overexploited and face external environmental 
threats.  In the United States, federal regulators report that 56 of 162 major fish stocks are 
overfished.1 Furthermore, many fisheries are overcapitalized relative to the catch that would 
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1  This means that the rate of fishing mortality jeopardizes the capacity of the fishery to produce its "maximum 
sustainable yield" on a continuing basis (NMFS 2001).   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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maximize net economic returns to society.  Too many boats chasing too few fish bring our ocean 
resources to the brink of collapse and sometimes beyond, as happened in the New England 
groundfish fishery in the early 1990s (NOAA 1999). 
Figure 1: America's Ocean 
Source: Our Living Oceans 1999: A report on the status of the U.S. Living Marine Resources. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1999. 
 
Although the threat of stock collapse is of great concern, the effect of overfishing extends 
beyond just that.  Overfishing can exacerbate bycatch problems—such as the unwanted 
interaction with other fisheries, turtles, and even birds while fishing—which lead to waste and 
increased fish and marine life mortality as non-target species are caught and then discarded at 
sea.  Also, fishing practices and gear can damage fragile ocean habitats.  Bottom trawlers, for 
example, can severely alter the ocean floor and benthic ecosystems, which provide food and 
shelter for fish and other marine species.  The loss or damage of these ocean ecosystems causes 
disturbances in food chains and, ultimately, the loss of unique marine-life communities (NRC 
2000). Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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Sidebar I: Status of Protection in 
U.S. Waters 
Unlike unique and irreplaceable 
land-based resources, very little of our 
national ocean treasure is protected.  The 
nation has 300 specially designated marine 
areas managed by federal and state agencies 
and nongovernmental organizations 
(NOAA 1999).  These include 12 marine 
sanctuaries in federal waters, national 
parks, seashores, monuments, and wildlife 
refuges, national estuarine research 
reserves, national estuary program areas, 
and areas designated for rebuilding stocks 
in federal fishery management plans.  But 
together, these areas cover less than 1% of 
America’s ocean, and less than 1% of this 
area is set aside as marine reserves, where 
fishing is prohibited (NOAA 1999).  The 
status of marine resource protection 
contrasts sharply with land-based resources, 
where state and federal wilderness 
preservation systems protect about 5% of 
the nation's land resources from most 
human disturbances. 
Our coastal resources are also coming 
under increasing stress, as more people move to 
the coast, which ultimately threatens marine 
biodiversity and productivity. For example, 
between 1986 and 1997, the United States 
experienced a net loss of 10,400 acres of 
estuarine and marine wetlands (Dahl 2000).  
Coastal development, including road 
construction, marina and port development, and 
dredging, accounted for most of this loss, and 
are most intense along the Gulf of Mexico and 
Atlantic coasts.  Furthermore, runoff from 
urban streets, lawns, and agricultural areas, 
arising from greater development on the coast, 
delivers nutrients and chemicals to coastal 
estuaries and wetlands.  These pollutants can 
cause fish kills and even stimulate algae 
blooms, which rob the water of oxygen and 
leave behind dead zones, such as the one found 
in the Gulf of Mexico that is the size of the 
state of New Jersey.  
To help protect and restore fisheries, and to conserve biodiversity and cultural heritage 
sites (e.g., sunken ships), many fishery scientists and managers are promoting the use of marine 
protected areas (Scientific Consensus 2001, NRC 2000).2  Historically, very little of the U.S. 
waters are protected (see Sidebar I). However, that could change with two executive orders by 
the Clinton administration that put political might behind the need for and use of marine 
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protected areas (MPAs).  The first order created the Coral Reef Task Force, whose mission is to 
strengthen the stewardship of the nation’s coral reefs (Federal Register 1998).  The task force 
recommended designating special areas, including “no-take zones, to protect and replenish coral 
reef ecosystems and prevent future harmful impacts" (Task Force 2000).  The second and 
arguably more far-reaching effort came in 2000, when federal agencies were instructed to 
develop a national system of MPAs (Federal Register 2000).3  
As fishery policy moves from recommendations to implementation, there will be an ever-
increasing set of questions about how MPAs will affect local, regional, and national stakeholders 
that have come to depend on the oceans for their livelihood, recreation, and overall well-being. 
For example, commercial fishermen, who are displaced by a closure, surely will be concerned 
about how the set-aside will affect their ability to make a living.  Recreational fishers might be 
concerned about their access to the protected area even if commercial fishing is excluded.  And, 
finally, groups representing the well-being of current and future generations might ask what are 
the consequences if we do not set aside a significant amount of the near-shore habitat.  Probably 
nowhere in the world is this more likely than in U.S. fishery management, where the 
stakeholders include commercial and recreational fishing interests, scientists, environmental 
organizations, and local, state, and national government agencies (see Sidebar II).   
Given the recent momentum in both the public and scientific arena for creating MPAs, it 
appears that there is social value in creating areas free from exploitation within the marine 
environment.  However, important questions remain on the goals and uses, location, size and 
number of MPAs (Walters 1999, Sanchirico 2000).  To help shed light on the economic and 
social component of these questions, we highlight in this chapter the benefits and costs 
associated with setting aside areas of the marine habitat.  
Before discussing the potential economic and social effects of MPAs, we discuss briefly 
the ecology of MPAs and the mechanisms that lead to the many stated benefits.  We go on to 
describe the institutional environment where MPAs will be sited, because of its importance in 
determining the long-run effectiveness of MPAs and the potential support they will receive in the 
implementation process.  In section 4, we discuss within a benefit-cost framework how these 
biological benefits might translate into economic and social benefits and how siting a MPA 
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Sidebar II: Management 
Jurisdictions and Statutory Authority
Coastal States have jurisdiction out to 3 
nautical miles (except for Texas and the west coast 
of Florida, where state waters extend out to 9) and  
the federal government has jurisdiction from 3 to 
200 nautical miles.  Beyond federal waters, 
international law and multilateral agreements 
between governments regulate marine resources.  
Federal and state laws regulating the use of 
marine resources are implemented by government 
agencies subject to the public trust doctrine.  This 
means that government managers are the exclusive 
public trustees and stewards of marine resources, 
which belong to every citizen.  In this respect, access 
to and use of marine resources is different from 
other natural resources, like forest and rangelands, 
which are, in part, privately owned and managed. 
At the federal level, there is no overarching 
federal statute that deals with the establishment and 
management of MPAs.  The first set of MPAs came 
about under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, which was passed to protect marine areas that 
contained resources of biological, historic, and 
economic significance.  Today there are 12 national 
marine sanctuaries in federal waters.  As for the use 
of MPAs in fisheries management, the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 
the primary federal legislation governing U.S. 
fisheries, grants to eight regional councils the legal 
authority to consider and implement MPAs, 
including no-take marine reserves, within their 
fishery management plans.  In recent years, several 
regional councils have established committees to 
evaluate the use of MPAs as a tool to restore fish 
stocks and to protect essential fish habitat.   
In state waters, MPAs are subject to 
regulation by the individual states.  Federal and state 
partnerships have resulted in the creation of marine 
protected areas that typically cover coastal waters, 
intertidal areas and land.  NOAA has listed 39 
candidate federal and state partnerships sites for 
consideration in its compilation of MPAs in the 
United States. 
entails costs.  We employ a benefit-cost 
framework because it is a convenient structure 
to organize and classify potential outcomes, 
tradeoffs, and the risks associated with these 
choices (Freeman and Portney 1989).  Its use 
does not imply that all potential benefits and 
costs are easily identified or even quantifiable.  
In fact, we address issues surrounding the 
calculation of benefits and costs in section 5.  
At the same time, we highlight some of the 
equity issues that are bound to arise during the 
debates about where to put MPAs.  In the last 
section, we discuss where, when, and how 
MPAs might yield the greatest benefit to the 
public.  
Ecology of Marine Protected Areas 
A significant body of literature 
examines the theoretical and empirical 
biological effects of MPAs on habitats and the 
productivity of fish stocks (Dugan and Davis 
1993; Roberts and Polunin 1991; Carr and 
Reed 1993; Allison et al. 1998; Carr and 
Raimondi 1998; Palumbi 1999; Boersma and 
Parrish 1999; Lindeman et al. 2000).  This 
literature provides valuable information relating 
to the design, site selection, and 
implementation of MPAs.  MPAs are found to 
be effective in protecting critical habitats, as 
spatial havens for intensely exploited species, 
as sources of stock for adjacent areas, and as 
potential buffers against management errors.   
In general, the biological mechanisms that can make MPAs effective as fishery 
management tools are rather simple.  When exploitation is ceased in an area, resident fish Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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populations begin to recover.  As the populations recover, the abundance of fish increases, 
including the number of older and larger fish that would have been caught if fishing were 
allowed to continue.  In this way, MPAs provide direct protection to that fraction of the total fish 
stock residing within its boundaries.  If these populations are mobile, then as the fish stocks 
recover, there will be spillover into other areas.  The amount and range of the spillover depends 
on the dispersal characteristics of the populations that reside in the reserve.  For example, if the 
population were rather sedentary (e.g., Red Sea urchin), then one would not expect any adult or 
juvenile dispersal.  On the other hand, if the population is more mobile (e.g.for example, 
rockfish), then we might expect to see some spillover of adults and juveniles.  Aside from adult 
and juvenile movements, spillover could occur if larvae from the closed area disperse to the open 
areas (Hastings and Botsford 1999; Pezzey et al. 2000). Further, if older and larger fish are more 
fecund, then the amount of larvae in the entire system might increase after a closure.  
While the general principles are simple, measuring the magnitude and persistence of 
these benefits are not.  First, existing MPAs were not designed as experiments to test for these 
factors, which means that disentangling the protected area effect and the effect due to 
heterogeneous habitats  is empirically difficult (Garcia-Charton & Perez-Ruzafa 1999).  Second, 
the marine environment is an extremely difficult arena in which to do empirical work; in part, 
because research to determine abundance and species diversity often relies on sampling 
techniques with high degrees of imprecision, such as visual sampling (Polunin and Roberts 
1993).  Finally, there exists uncertainty about the extent to which different areas in the marine 
system are connected by larval dispersal processes, adult and juvenile dispersal patterns, and/or 
seasonal migrations.  This concern is raised not to diminish these benefits, but to point out that 
the magnitudes of these effects are uncertain and pose a major challenge in quantifying the 
benefits and costs of MPAs.  Nevertheless, for our purposes, we operate under the premise that 
the ecological benefits within the protected area are realized and that there exists some spillover 
into the remaining fishable waters (Scientific Consensus, 2001).  
Institutional Setting 
In 1954, H.S. Gordon pointed out in a seminal article on the economics of fishery 
management that overfishing and overcapacity would plague open-access fisheries.  His 
reasoning was that without any "sense of ownership" over a fish until it is on board their vessel, 
fishermen will engage in a race-to-fish.  Further, both theory and historical record show that the 
race will continue until fish stocks are depleted and the number and types of vessels in a fishery 
exceed its viable capacity.  Because of "rule of capture" incentives, fishermen neither take into Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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Sidebar III: Too Many Boats Chasing 
Too Few Fish 
Ocean fisheries are a common property 
resource, which means that no one exercises 
complete control over them.  Therefore, in the mind 
of a fisherman, a fish that is not caught today is 
someone else’s fish tomorrow.  Without exclusive 
harvest rights, no single fisherman can exclude 
others from exploiting the fish stock.  As a result, 
individual fishermen act rationally to maximize their 
share of the catch by investing in bigger boats and 
more gear.  This outcome, however, is ultimately 
destructive, as too many boats race to catch their 
share of a declining stock.     
Depleted fisheries are often troubled by 
overcapitalization.  In other words, more capital is 
invested in the fishery than is needed to harvest an 
optimal yield. This imposes a cost on society 
because the excess capital and labor that is 
employed in fishing could be employed in other 
sectors of the economy to produce goods and 
services whose net benefits exceed those generated 
by harvesting additional fish. 
account how their catches today will impact 
future catch levels nor the costs associated with 
excess fishing capacity (see Sidebar III).  As 
many have noted since, if a policy intervention 
can directly address these incentives, then it 
would treat the fundamental causes of excess 
effort in fisheries and the symptoms, 
overfishing and overcapacity, would subside.    
Today many fisheries throughout the 
world are no longer open-access, however, 
fishermen continue to operate under "rule of 
capture" incentives.  In fact, current fishery 
management efforts have, for the most part, 
overlooked the role of incentives in shaping 
behavior and sought rather to focus on effort 
controls, such as trip limits, seasonal closures, 
and gear restrictions.  Unfortunately, these 
regulations treat the symptoms of the problem 
and not the fundamental causes.  A consequence is that signs of a recovery in fish populations 
can often attract additional fishing effort, as the perception of lower costs and greater-than-actual 
benefits entice new entrants and induce existing fishermen to apply more effort to sustain their 
enterprises.  As a result, any short-run gains in stock levels and profits are not sustainable due to 
the policy-induced responses of the fishermen.    
One way to address the causes of excess effort is a form of social control, or regulation, 
that turns "open" access to the fishery into "closed" access.  Individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs), a property rights-based approach, is one possible form of regulation that is being used in 
many different fisheries and countries—including the United States—to regulate fishing efforts 
to the benefit of fishermen and the environment (NRC 1999).4  Under ITQ management, the total 
                                                 
4 There are many possible rights-based approaches to fishery management, such as cooperatives (e.g., Alaskan 
Pollock), community development quota (e.g., select Alaskan communities), and individual transferable quotas (e.g., 
Alaskan Halibut).  As each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages that are beyond the scope of this 
paper, we point the interested reader to the 1999 NRC report called Sharing the Fish Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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allowable catch is capped and the privilege of harvesting the catch is allocated to individual 
fishermen through quota shares that are secure and transferable with the objective of maximizing 
net economic returns.  
How do incentives, property rights, and institutions affect the economic and social value 
derived from MPAs?  In fact, the institutional setting where MPAs are being considered is a 
critical component in determining whether and how the benefits will persist over space and time 
and it has direct implications for the level of support MPAs could receive in the implementation 
process.  For example, if fishermen believe that they will bear the costs of being displaced from 
an area and—due to the lack of exclusive harvesting rights—have no guarantee that they will 
capture the benefits of stock recovery, then it is likely their support will wane, everything else 
being equal.  On the other hand, if the fishermen perceive that they will benefit from MPAs, then 
it is more likely they will support implementation.  In an ITQ fishery, for example, fishermen no 
longer have an incentive to overcapitalize and race-to-fish, or take other actions that could 
dissipate some of the economic and social benefits of MPAs.  In fact, if MPAs provide 
significant biological benefits, then these will be reflected in the long-run value of the fishery.  
As the fishermen hold shares of the total allowable catch , any increases in long-run value of the 
fishery make those shares more valuable and that provides fishermen with a tangible financial 
reason to care about the productivity of fish stocks and the essential marine habitats that support 
them.   
Economic and Social Implications 
The social sciences have contributed to a relatively small but steadily growing body of 
literature that examines the economic and social implications of MPAs (Farrow 1996; Hoagland 
et al. 1995; Milon 2000; Sanchirico 2000).  The literature asks under what conditions might the 
conservation gains attributed to MPAs provide the largest benefit for the smallest cost.  To 
answer this question, fishery managers will need to have a better understanding of how 
fishermen and other users choose the location of their efforts and how these choices will be 
affected by the MPA.  In fact, displacement of effort both across the fishing grounds and into 
other fisheries is arguably a fundamental driver in determining the type and magnitude of the 
benefits from MPAs.   Research into these questions will be helpful in guiding public-and 
private-sector decision making when it comes to determining the scale, scope, and siting of 
MPAs.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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From society’s perspective, MPAs are a public investment of marine resources 
(Sanchirico 2000, Zinn and Buck 2001). The decision to commit resources can be guided by a 
benefit-cost framework that measures whether the potential benefits of protection—adjusted to 
account for risks—outweigh the potential costs.  Like other public investments, the potential 
benefits and costs of MPAs are realized both over the short and long run.  For example, closing 
off an area that historically contributed a significant catch would probably reduce the total catch, 
at least in the short run.  As population levels begin to recover in the MPA and spillover to the 
remaining fishable waters increases, total catch levels might increase (Sanchirico 1998).  How 
long might it take this response to occur?  The answer will depend, in part, on the biological 
characteristics of the fish (e.g., fast-growing or slow-growing stocks) and how responsive the 
fishermen are to the economic and biological conditions (Sanchirico 1998).    
In what follows, we divide the potential benefits and costs of MPAs between extractive 
(e.g., commercial and recreational fishing) and non-extractive users (e.g., eco-tourists) and 
management.5  Examples of the benefit and cost categories for this set of stakeholders are found 
in Table 1. 
                                                 
5 Two potentially significant groups of stakeholders that we do not address are upstream polluters who could be 
affected by new water quality restrictions that accompany the siting of an MPA and offshore oil and natural gas 
interests who may find their options reduced.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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Table 1: Potential Benefits and Costs of Marine Protected Areas 
Categories Benefits  Costs 
Extractive  Users 
(e.g., commercial and 
recreational fishermen) 
increase in catch 
reduced variation in catch 
improved catch mix (i.e., greater 
frequency of older/larger fish) 
 
decrease in catch 
congestion on the fishing grounds 
user conflicts 
higher costs associated with choice 
of fishing location  
increase in safety risks 
 
Non-extractive Users 
(e.g., divers, eco-tourists, 
and existence value) 
maintain species diversity 
greater habitat complexity and diversity 
higher density levels 
damage to marine ecosystem 
loss of traditional fishing 
community 
 
Management scientific  knowledge 
hedge against uncertain stock 
assessments 
educational opportunities 
increase in monitoring and 
enforcement costs 
foregone economic opportunities 
(e.g., oil, gas, and mineral 
exploration and bio-prospecting) 
 
 
Benefits to Extractive Users 
MPAs that stabilize or increase fish populations inside their boundaries could provide a 
similar function outside the protected area if the spillover effect is significant.  This, in turn, 
could result in reduced variations in aggregate catch levels (Lauck et al. 1998) or an increase in 
the long-run total catch.  In the end, the net impact on catch depends on the relative importance 
of the area set-aside in the total catch before the closure and the status of the fish stock.  For 
example, if the area contributed a significant share of total catch, it is less likely that total catch 
will increase, because the threshold level that the biological spillover effects must overcome is 
higher.  On the other hand, if the catch level is an insignificant share of total catch, possibly 
because of over-exploitation before the closure, then the probability of increasing the total catch 
is higher.  In an over-exploited system, and when fish stocks are neither too sessile nor too 
mobile, long-run total catch levels have been shown (theoretically) to increase after an area is 
set-aside from harvesting (Sanchirico and Wilen 1998). Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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MPAs can also increase the market value of a fishery by changing the composition of the 
catch.  One of the uses of traditional area and time closures has been to provide protection to 
stocks to enhance market value by altering selectivity (OECD 1997).  Selectivity could be 
altered, for example, if a closure is implemented in an area where a high proportion of the stock 
is young.  In this case, fishing effort will be displaced to other areas, or to a different time period, 
resulting in a catch of larger fish and perhaps higher market prices.  Another possible increase in 
revenues could occur if the changes in catch composition from smaller to larger fish are 
accompanied by a shift to a more valuable product form (such as frozen to fresh product).  
Costs to Extractive Users 
Although there is a considerable amount of literature investigating the biological benefits 
of MPAs, the potential costs have not received much attention.  In general, fishing is a complex 
process that depends on many factors, including the type of vessel and gear used, target species, 
stock density, and time and areas fished.  The inputs into this process affect the costs associated 
with fishing and, therefore, impact the activity level.  One can imagine, for instance, that less 
congestion at a given fishing ground could lower the cost per unit of catch.  Costs could also 
differ across fishing grounds due to oceanographic conditions, such as stronger currents that 
increase fuel use and/or geographic features that prohibit the use of certain gear types.  Within 
the current debate, an important question is how could the introduction of MPAs affect these 
types of costs.  
Reducing the amount of area open to fishing implies that, at least in the short-run, vessels 
could experience higher levels of congestion on the remaining grounds.  Congestion effects 
could result in increases in fuel usage and higher capital costs (e.g., fish finding equipment).  In 
addition, significantly reducing the amount of fishable waters could also lead to increased 
conflicts between users of the resource, such as allocation disputes and gear entanglements.  A 
potential conflict could arise, for example, from a trawler displaced by an MPA venturing into an 
area traditionally occupied by fixed-gear fishermen only.  In this example, the costs of harvesting 
increase not only for the displaced trawler, but also for the fixed-gear fishermen, who otherwise 
might not have been affected directly by the closures.  Congestion effects might not only be 
concentrated in the fishery for which the closure was implemented, as establishment of an MPA 
could shift fishing pressure from one species to another, thereby increasing the competition for 
the catch of that second species (Sanchirico 2000). Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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A fisherman's decision of where to fish depends on many factors, including time of year, 
targeted species, expected time at sea, expected catch rates, transportation costs, search costs, 
location-specific costs, dock-side prices, and weather-related events.  To understand how these 
factors might change after a closure, we discuss transportation costs—including time spent 
traveling and searching for fish.  Following siting of an MPA, if vessels spend more time 
steaming to and from the fishing grounds, fuel use will be greater and the amount of time that 
vessels will spend with fishing gear in the water will be reduced.  The increases in steam-time 
can create incentives for skippers to invest in additional capacity, such as larger hold size, 
improvements in fishing gear, and more horsepower.  An MPA, therefore, can have the 
unintended consequence of increasing capital expenditures in the fishery at a time when fishery 
managers are trying to find ways to reduce capacity, perhaps with a vessel buy-back program.   
 In many fisheries, a significant component of total variable harvesting costs is the time 
and fuel spent searching for fish.  In modeling harvesting costs, a basic assumption is that higher 
stock levels imply that search costs are lower, everything else being equal.  This effect is 
commonly referred to as the “stock effect.”  If MPAs are used in a fishery where the stock effect 
is significant, then they could potentially reduce this component of harvesting costs.  For 
instance, if the biological spillover effects are large and far-reaching, then there is a possibility 
that stock levels will increase throughout the fishery.  In this case, one would expect searching 
costs to decrease.  If the MPAs provide significant spillover, searching costs could also decrease 
if fishermen simply concentrate in the areas surrounding the MPAs.  On the other hand, if the 
spillover effects are negligible, then searching costs might increase after MPAs are established.  
For example, displaced fishermen, who have local knowledge of fish concentrations, might need 
to spend additional time and effort learning about stock concentrations and oceanographic 
conditions that exist in the remaining non-protected areas. 
Recognizing that fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations in the world, fishery 
managers should not discount the fact that certain types of regulations can increase occupational 
risks.  Closing a near-shore environment, like a sheltered lagoon, could force fishermen to 
venture out to more distant waters.  Operating further offshore will increase the time it would 
take to return to port, placing fishermen at greater risks from storms.  These risks could be 
exacerbated if inshore fishermen, who are displaced by the MPA, are unable to secure the capital 
needed to make the necessary upgrades to their gear and vessels before heading offshore.  The 
combination of inadequate vessels and lack of experience of the displaced fishermen “forced” to 
operate in new, riskier environments poses the potential for greater occupational risks and higher 
costs from increases in search and rescue missions.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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Benefits to Non-extractive Users 
Research shows that MPAs can increase biodiversity and allow a marine ecosystem to 
return to its "natural" state (e.g., Boersma and Parrish 1999).  Non-extractive users may value 
these changes to the marine ecosystem.  For example, designating a special marine area, like a 
park or sanctuary, to protect biodiversity may increase its usefulness; such an area could be used 
for diving and photography.  Improving the health of the ocean may also appeal to individuals 
who might never intend to use the area, but who value its existence nonetheless.  If a MPA does 
attract new visitors, this can lead to additional jobs, income, and tax revenues for the local 
community.  It is even possible that potential increases in revenue from tourism could offset 
potential losses due to lower commercial or recreational catches because of the closure.  
Obviously, the location and setting of a particular MPA would play a critical role in the 
magnitude of these benefits and costs.  For example, a protected area offshore that is mainly 
occupied by bottom-dwelling species will most likely not have a significant tourism potential, 
while a coral-reef closure might.  In general, a MPA can offer protection and provide the 
possibility for economic returns to sectors of the economy not directly tied to commercial 
fishing.  In fact, studies of marine parks in the Caribbean found that proper management could 
yield both (Dixon et al. 1993).    
Costs to Non-extractive Users   
The lack of understanding about the long-term carrying capacity of a designated area, 
such as a marine park, raises important questions about sustainable use.  If tourism is left 
unchecked, for example, increased pressure on resources within the area could reduce the very 
biological benefits—such as abundant biodiversity and more fish—and cultural benefits that 
closing off the area to extractive users was supposed to protect.  The utility derived by visitors 
could also be negatively impacted by the popularity of the site as more visitors result in higher 
levels of congestion within the site.  If there is a direct relationship between the demand to visit a 
site and site quality (e.g., the probability of seeing large fauna and flora, or a special coral reef 
ecosystem) then congestion and the detrimental impacts associated with it could lead to fewer 
visitors and lower economic benefits.  Ultimately, all values derived from the MPA could be 
reduced with unchecked tourism, implying that there is a need to couple siting decisions with 
management designed to limit the impact of non-extractive users.   
People who value traditional coastal fishing communities may also be negatively affected 
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fishable waters.  An example might be a small and isolated fishing community that targets a 
fishery that inhabits a near-shore coral reef.  If the goal of the MPA is to protect the in situ 
biodiversity of that near-shore reef, then a large area might be protected.  Because of the closure, 
local fishermen who might not have the financial resources to operate in waters farther offshore 
could be forced out of the fishing business.  In some communities, the next best opportunity 
could be working in the tourism trade, but as the economic base shifts from fishing to tourism, a 
traditional way of life could be lost.6 Furthermore, local residents of the community who do not 
participate directly in fishing may feel that they are also deprived of their traditional way of life 
if greater tourism activities and negative impacts, such as congestion, are associated with the 
MPA (Hoagland et al. 1995).  
Management Benefits 
MPAs could provide "undisturbed" areas creating new opportunities for scientific 
research and offering a hedge against management errors.  Scientists argue that these areas can 
be used as controls to monitor and study the recovery of fish populations that will improve 
estimates of population parameters (e.g., more reliable estimates of growth and natural mortality 
rates) and stock assessments, which currently rely too heavily on commercial catch data.  
Reducing the current level of uncertainty and improving the science in stock abundance forecasts 
can only improve the long-run management of fisheries.  If poor stock assessments or inadequate 
political will to set total allowable catches at sustainable levels are the primary causes of 
overfishing, then MPAs might be a good hedge against such errors.  
The effectiveness of MPAs in meeting their management objectives will be influenced by 
how fishermen respond to them and the presence of external threats, such as nutrient pollution 
and meteorological disturbances.  In two studies, investigating the implications of MPAs—which 
include behavioral models of the fishing industry—the models predict that harvesting pressure 
outside and, particularly, along the boundaries of the MPA will increase (Sanchirico 1998; 
Walters 1999).  There is some anecdotal evidence that this has occurred outside an MPA located 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that many local fishing communities are on the brink of collapse because of historically low 
catches.  If that is the case, then the shift of the economic base out of fishing into tourism could help sustain the 
local population.  However, other fishery management policies, such as ITQs or community development quotas, 
could be used to benefit local residents while maintaining the traditional way of life. 
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off the coast of Kenya, where the number of traps increase dramatically in the immediate vicinity 
of the protected area (McClanahan and Kaunda-Arara 1996).  This increase in effort along the 
edge of the MPA led the authors to conclude that the spillover benefits have been quickly 
dissipated.  Additionally, the costs associated with increased competition could induce fishermen 
to adopt fishing practices that yield the highest private return subject to the new MPA constraint, 
but also could increase the amount of habitat destruction in the remaining fishable water. 
With respect to the presence of external threats, the fact that a marine ecosystem is open 
and subject to broad oceanographic shocks may reduce the degree of protection and lower the 
value of an MPA as a hedge.  MPAs are not protected from external threats, like nutrient 
pollution, coastal erosion, diversion of freshwater, and broad environmental shocks, such as 
those caused by El Nino.  Environmental damage like the "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico is 
evidence of the threats from upstream nutrient runoff that can affect the health of a protected 
area.  On the other hand, the existence of a special place, like the Flower Gardens National 
Marine Sanctuary off the Texas and Louisiana coast, may help create a constituency to work to 
reduce upstream nutrient pollution and other environmental damages.  
When trying to manage complex, multispecies fisheries, some studies have shown that 
MPAs may be a feasible alternative to conventional fishery management tools (Holland and 
Brazee 1996; Lauck et al. 1998; Roberts 1997).  Multispecies fisheries are often difficult to 
manage because regulations or market demand may shift effort from one species to another or 
result in greater discards.  If designed and sited properly, MPAs may offer a second-best solution 
to stem overfishing in multispecies fisheries, such as the reef fishes in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Southeastern United States.       
Management Costs 
In the absence of any changes in how the fishery is managed, MPAs will likely increase 
management costs because of the need for additional monitoring and enforcement.  If there is 
little or no enforcement and monitoring of the protected area, then the expected biological 
benefits might not be realized.  Some experienced fishermen believe that MPA boundaries 
simply cannot be enforced given the strong incentive to poach in protected areas, the remote 
nature of fishing grounds, and limited budgets for enforcement.  On the other hand, monitoring 
and enforcement costs are likely to depend on factors such as the size, location, and use 
restrictions of MPAs, fishery management regulations, local fishing practices and customs, and 
the available technology.  The increase in costs might not be significant if fishery managers Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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employ new technology such as a global positioning satellite network that can automatically 
monitor the location of fishing vessels, or alert authorities if a fishing vessel enters a closed area.  
This technology is being used successfully around the Great Barrier Reef in Australia and the 
Georges Bank off the coast of Maine, and has reduced the need for fishery patrol vessels (The 
Economist 2001).   
Political Economy of Implementation Decisions 
When marine resources owned by all Americans and managed by federal and state 
governments are dedicated to a particular use, like a MPA, a public investment has been made.   
The desirability of such an investment can be found by weighing potential benefits and costs as 
described above, along with equally important moral, ethical, and cultural values.  While the 
latter values are largely beyond the scope of this chapter, they often play a major role in shaping 
resource management decisions.   
Benefit-Cost Analysis 
The benefits and costs of MPAs can be systematically identified and described. However, 
a precise calculation of the expected net benefits obtained by expressing all benefits and costs in 
dollar terms is often not feasible.  Like other public investments, the potential benefits of MPAs 
will often be realized at some future date, whereas many of the costs are incurred immediately, 
implying that closing off areas results in an inter-temporal tradeoff, perhaps even across 
generations (Holland and Brazee 1996; Sanchirico and Wilen 1998; Hannesson 1999; Pezzey et 
al. 2000).  Difficulties also stem from the complexity and corresponding degree of imprecision  
when trying to predict the impact of a new management tool on biological and economic 
systems.   
Another difficulty for managers is the task of predicting and quantifying the non-
extractive use values associated with the closure.  It is generally understood that these values are 
an important consideration in resource allocation decisions.  In fact, many recent calls for MPAs 
have cited potentially large economic returns from ecotourism activities and conservation values 
associated with biodiversity preservation.  Given the current lack of research on the magnitude of 
these benefits for marine resources, however, it will be difficult in the near future to fully 
incorporate them in decision making processes. Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
17 
Equity and Fairness Concerns  
Every public investment has equity or fairness implications and MPAs are no exception.   
Equity issues among the stakeholders in the process can easily arise because MPAs will most 
likely affect user groups disproportionately (Holland 2000).  For example, if an MPA is sited 
within the near-shore environment, the inshore fleet could potentially incur the highest cost (such 
as the direct loss of fishable waters), while the offshore fleet could receive most of the benefits. 
Not surprisingly, distributional effects are very important in the political realm of decision 
making.   
Commercial and recreational fishermen often fear they will bear the costs of closing areas 
but will not be the recipients of the benefits.  Such a change in the distribution of benefits and 
costs—real or perceived—is inevitably the subject of considerable dispute.  Better understanding 
of the benefits and costs may reveal ways to compensate the losers and allow the MPA proposal 
to go forward.  Otherwise, one might reasonably expect political intervention aimed at restricting 
management options.  For example, if recreational fishermen fear their interests will be harmed 
by arbitrary closures, one might expect a call for legislation requiring scientific evidence of 
damages before adopting MPAs (Murray 2001).   
In some cases, changing the design of an MPA could address the equity issue. This is an 
option worth consideration.  However, manipulating conservation tools may not be the best way 
to address inequities.  Even though the public nature of marine resources implies that creating an 
MPA does not constitute a "taking" (although fishermen may not perceive it that way) requiring 
compensation, another possible option might be to provide direct payments to those who bear 
real costs when MPAs are implemented.   
Concerns about fairness emphasize the importance of a public outreach strategy to 
identify who are the stakeholders that need to reach consensus on management objectives, 
location and design, and use of MPAs (Dobrzynski and Nicholson 2001).   When deciding on 
MPAs, resource managers run the risk of placing too much emphasis in the beginning on where 
to site MPAs and how much of the resource to protect and too little emphasis on the 
socioeconomic considerations (NRC 2000).  Therefore, those most affected by the decision are 
not given an opportunity to participate until a later stage when it may appear that important 
decisions have already been made.  This approach can often stymie efforts to establish MPAs 
because those that have the most to lose will set out to undermine the effort.  Rather than run this 
risk, resource managers ought to start the process by identifying all of the stakeholders, including 
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involve them at each stage of the decisionmaking process.  This way, the socioeconomic aspects 
of establishing MPAs, which often are the deciding factor in determining whether MPAs succeed 
or fail, can be considered in an integrated way along with the ecological factors.    
Such an approach led to the successful establishment of the Tortugas Ecological Reserve, 
which is approximately 70 miles west of Key West in the Florida Keys National Marine 
Sanctuary.  Once the idea was put forth, a working group was created as part of the Sanctuary 
Advisory Council, which is made up of stakeholders, to develop the boundary alternatives for the 
reserve and prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement.  Technical advisory teams 
included a physical science  (e.g., oceanographers and biologists) and a socioeconomics group 
(e.g., economists and sociologists) whose roles were to advise the working group during the 
process of developing boundary alternatives for the reserve.  The socioeconomics team identified 
all the current users of the study area, quantified the spatial distribution of economic use and 
activity, provided maps of the commercial and recreational fisheries and drafted profiles of the 
various user groups (Leeworthy and Wiley 2000).  After two years and many negotiations, the 
stakeholders agreed upon a preferred alternative for siting the ecological reserve (Leeworthy and 
Wiley 2000).   
Conclusions 
With many fisheries on the brink of collapse, fishery managers are looking to MPAs as 
critical tools in their recovery.  In fact, there is strong scientific evidence that MPAs are effective 
at preserving unique marine habitats, restoring fish populations that reside within the protected 
area, and as a way of ensuring that special treasures are preserved.  However, their roles in 
supplying biodiversity, providing a hedge against poor management and acts of nature, offering 
research opportunities, and as emigration sources for surrounding areas, depends on the scale, 
scope and location.  For example, marine biodiversity might only be enhanced if a significant 
number of representative habitats are set aside.  If fishery enhancement is the goal, then perhaps 
MPAs should be sited so the amount of spillover is maximized.  Regardless of the goal, scientific 
research is needed to guide the design, siting, and implementation of MPAs.  Careful planning 
and financial resources will also be needed to monitor MPAs for success or failure, alter their 
design as necessary, and enforce their boundaries. 
One possible way to increase the probability of MPAs succeeding in fishery enhancement 
is to couple them with other complementary management tools that address the causes of 
overfishing, such as individual transferable quotas.  Otherwise, the economic benefits, and Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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perhaps the biological ones as well, might quickly disappear as fishing efforts expand in 
response to recovering fish stocks.  Coupling MPAs with other more encompassing approaches 
that can address the causes of overfishing and overcapacity would certainly be a step forward in 
integrating the conservation of fish habitat with the prosperity of fishermen.  Improving both the 
economic and biological health of the fishery should appeal not only to fishermen and help win 
their support for MPAs, but also to anyone who is interested in sustainable use of our ocean 
resources.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out that protected areas do not address the 
causes of excess effort that trouble many fisheries.  In general, whether the use of MPAs has any 
discernable effect on excess effort or on catch levels will depend on the particulars of the MPA 
under consideration, the behavioral response of the fishermen, the pre-existing biological and 
economic conditions, and the institutional environment.   
Of course, in addition to fishery enhancement, MPAs will often provide important 
ancillary benefits.  For example, protecting coral reefs that store carbon and provide unique 
recreation opportunities, such as scuba diving or underwater photography, will yield benefits 
independent of fishery enhancement.  In addition, individuals who may never visit the site but 
benefit from knowing that rare habitats exist and endangered species are protected might value 
MPAs.  Although difficult to measure, such non-extractive values may exceed the value of 
foregone fishing opportunities.  But, until more data are collected and research is done on the 
magnitude of such values, weighing them against easier-to-quantify fishing impacts is difficult. 
A natural question to ask is under what conditions might one expect the benefits of a 
MPA to outweigh its costs.  Unfortunately, the answer depends in a nontrivial way on the goals, 
and the size and location of the area chosen for closure.  For example, the greater benefits are to 
non-extractive users, the lower are the access costs to the site and the greater is the probability 
that an individual will see features of the "pristine" habitat that are important to them.  One could 
imagine that coral reefs teeming with flora and fauna within the near-shore environment would 
have the highest non-extractive benefits.  Areas set-aside to protect fish stocks where older and 
larger fish either receive a price premium in commercial markets or are more attractive to 
recreational participants might increase the potential for positive short-run benefits.  Finally, if 
reducing potential costs to fishermen is important, then one might look to set-aside areas that 
contribute relatively less to their livelihood.  Why might one potential MPA site contribute less 
than another?  It could be because the species are widely dispersed throughout the fishing 
grounds or that the set-aside area is one of the least profitable areas to fish (Sanchirico and Wilen 
1999).  Another reason could be that the current scale of the MPA is such that it does not make 
any discernable impact on fishing profits.     Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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Whatever the specifics of the current design, the benefit-cost framework allows decision-
makers to examine the net economic benefits to society from investing in MPAs.   If the analysis 
takes into consideration the likely intertemporal nature of the returns, it can provide information 
on the distribution and timing of benefits and costs that could help resolve issues of fairness 
among those affected by MPAs.  However, political obstacles to adopting MPAs are likely to 
remain significant.  Fishermen bear most of the costs in the short run when a protected area is 
set-aside, while improvements in catch size and composition may not be realized until the distant 
future.  Because of the uncertainty surrounding the benefits and costs of MPAs and how they 
will be divided, fishermen—like many others—may be inclined to take political action to block 
the siting of an MPA, especially when there is a perception that the current management regime 
is sustainable.   
A robust stakeholder process is likely to lead to better decisions concerning MPAs.  
Fishery managers need to engage fishermen, environmentalists, and other concerned citizens in 
setting goals for MPAs and in taking responsibility for achieving the goals.  Fishermen, for 
example, could help fishery managers and biologists with decisions about where to site reserves 
that will have the greatest fishery benefit, but at the lowest cost to the fishermen.  But for 
fishermen and others to participate effectively, the decision making process needs to be 
decentralized and information must be exchanged at the regional or local level.  In this way, the 
values and beliefs of local resource users can shape an inherently scientific endeavor.  It may 
also strengthen accountability for implementation and increase the likelihood that fishermen will 
benefit.  Resources for the Future  Sanchirico, Cochran, and Emerson 
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